The Irony

Most notably, there are two concerns with religious intervention in the political or policy-making process. First, religious intervention and more specifically Christianity, establish God or the Bible as a legitimate authority. For example, torture is immoral because God says so in the Bible. Such argumentation presupposes that one or society ought to do whatever God or the Bible says. Second, religious intervention creates a problem of civility, or incivility. Religious arguments fail to resonate with a large portion of society whose members do not share the same religious belief cited to support the given argument. If a view supported only by religious belief prevails, it would not be because the argument has convinced everyone else (including non-believers), but because of religious dominance.

Some claim that a sense of implicit theocracy is embedded into religious argument. Before I begin to consider this notion of implicit theocracy, I shall consider two types of authority. First, theoretical authority: Paul Krugman is a renown economist. Owing to his educational background, experience, and academic work, Krugman’s ideas on economics are considered to be authoritative, particularly in comparison to one who studies law or medicine. Next to theoretical authority is practical authority. An example of practical authority is a police officer, a judge, or a legislator. In other words, one who exercises power and judgment over another. The concern with implicit theocracy in religious intervention is a concern about religion acting as a practical authority; that is, church leaders ruling society. If abortion is illegal because the Pope has denounced it, this is an act of practical authority. An authoritative figure, and in this case religious authoritative figure, legalizes or illegalizes an action solely on the premise that he or she says so. Most religions, however, make arguments such as: abortion is wrong or immoral, not because the Pope said so. Just as Paul Krugman is considered to be a theoretical authority on the financial crisis, there is certainly the possibility of there being an expert (not a ruler) on ethics or deep values. It would be dishonest and frankly silly to assert that any authority on ethics acts as a ruler which imposes values rather than acting as an intellectual guide to help one reach one’s own conclusions. In short, what is the difference between Paul Krugman as an expert and an expert in religion or ethics? Absolutely nothing.

Some accuse religious intervention and argumentation of assuming an implicit authority in biblical reference. Biblical reference, however, is nothing more than theoretical claim, similar to references to Krugman’s published works. Very rarely do Christians draw from the Bible to support policy arguments. Where in the Bible does it speak specifically to abortion or torture? Instead, religious arguments apply the principles or premises found in the Bible to a policy.

A policy debate on secular grounds respects and allows for mutual intelligibility; that is, everyone has the capacity (namely rationality) to understand the presented argument(s). Consider the following statement: “torture of God’s children is immoral. We ought to treat all as Jesus would.” Why would one make such a claim in a policy debate? There are multiple explanations. First, to persuade others to join a particular religion. Second, to persuade others of the seriousness of the issue of torture. Third, to explain why he or she believes this statement to be true. Fourth, to rally his or her own religious community. Fifth, to awaken his or her own community to the issue of (as in the given example) torture. If there may be multiple explanations behind this religious argument, one may ask; is engagement of non-believers and Christians necessarily a dialogue of death? Let us now consider two philosophical misconceptions as it relates to mutual intelligibility and the question posed above. The first misconception is: mutual understanding is an all or nothing business. A non-believer both completely understands and identifies with a religious argument or not. The second misconception is: communication is only possible between persons who share a common framework of concepts.

Is speaking on religious grounds to non-believers impossible and therefore uncivil? Just because only a few people are willing to step outside their familiar mind-set and seriously consider the ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ does not mean the thoughtful demand for understanding religious argument is uncivil. We cannot engage with every issue or everyone. Time does not permit. But just because one decides not to engage with religious argument and instead chooses to engage with Krugman or any other theoretical authority does not mean that the religious argument advanced is uncivil.

John Rawls spoke of a two-way translation. It is OK to speak in Old Testament rhetoric provided that in due course you translate meaning to non-believers or outsiders. If a religious argument uses a parable, according to Rawls, the individual advancing the argument must translate it into the language of socio-economic rights. In considering Rawls’ position, the question arises; should the burden of translation be placed on the speaker or ought it to be a cooperative task? I argue that it ought to be a cooperative task. It is not appropriate and is uncivil for seculars to strain not to understand. If seculars turn the ‘deaf ear’ to religious argument, they can hardly complain about the incivility of the speaker.